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ميحرلا نمحرلا للها مسب 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful 
 
ABSTRACT 
The rulings of Mua‟malat in today‟s Islamic Economics, and Finance can be 
adapted through the process of Ijtihad. While the basic principles or doctrines of 
the Mua‟malat are given in Shari‟ah, the interpretation of these principles to 
suit circumstances in different times and places constitutes the Fiqh Mua‟malat. 
New rulings can be reached by understanding the effective cause (Illah) and 
rationale (hikmah) of the original ruling and the importance of Maslaha (benefit) 
under the changed circumstances (Usul Fiqh); which is normally evaluated by 
the Shari‟ah Board members of the concerned entity. Fatwa issuing via Ijtihad 
is used to derive laws from the basic principles of Shari‟ah to address the 
needs of people in different places and times. The important aspect of these 
new rules is that they may at times change depending on the context of 
application. Islamic Finance contemporary practices of Ijtihad through various 
bodies like Islamic Fiqh Academy, have resolved the practice of taqlid (limitation). 
The doctrine of maqasid al-Shari‟ah establishes Maslahah as an essential 
element of the ends of law, so that it becomes an important goal in framing new 
rules (Shari‟ah parameters and guidelines) through Ijtihad. Thus, both the 
principles set by Shari‟ah and use of Ijtihad to frame new rules has Maslahah or 
benefit of people as the underlying basis and goal. 
On the other hand; the standardization of Shari‟ah may become against the 
fundamental premise of Ijtihad which has existed for centuries and especially in 
today‟s finance. If rules become standards, and imposed by legal authorities, 
then Ijtihad cannot be applied towards a critical and dynamic industry like 
Islamic Finance today. This will eventually damage the very reason that we are 
Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in 
Islamic Economics, and Finance 
2009 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
able to apply Shari‟ah in all times and places, that is, Ijtihad is the main reason 
why Shari‟ah is dynamic and is able to be applied in different circumstances. 
In addition; to standardize Shari‟ah rulings may mean the precedence of one 
Islamic school of thought over the other, which cannot be universally 
acceptable. There is no doubt that the synchronization of these two views has 
to be done through mutual understanding and collaboration between Shari‟ah 
scholars and various Shari‟ah key board members, market leaders, and 
regulators. To be very clear and accurate, the question of whether Shari‟ah 
standards can be harmonized is a matter to be dealt with by Shari‟ah scholars 
and not market professionals or regulators. The simple reason for this is 
because Shari‟ah scholars are specialized in their field and whether a Fatwa 
can be standardized or not is a matter of religious reasoning and should be 
taken from Shari‟ah own instructions and judgments. 
 
KEY WORDS: Fatwa1, fatawa2, Ijtihad3, Shari‟ah Board, Islamic Economics 
Jurisprudence4, GCC5, Ijma,  
 
                                                          
1 Religious decree : Alternative spelling = Fatwah, Fatawa  
2 Plural of Fatwa= Religious pronouncements by Fuqaha‟.  
3  Is the expending of maximum effort in the performance of an act. the word “Ijtihad” derived 
from the root word al-juhd, which means “exertion, effort, trouble or pain.” Al-juhd denotes 
exercising one‟s capacity, ability, power, or strength in a correct and righteous manner. 
Technically: Ijtihad it is the effort made by the Mujtahid  in seeking knowledge of the rules of 
the Shari‟ah through rules of interpretation stipulated in Islamic jurisprudence 
4 Fiqh = Islamic jurisprudence= the science of the Shari‟ah (an important source of Islamic 
economics). In contrast with conventional law, Fiqh covers all aspects of life, be it religious, 
political, social, commercial or economic. The whole corpus of Fiqh is based primarily on 
interpretations of the Qur‟an and the Sunnah and secondarily on ijma[ (consensus) and ijtihad 
(individual judgment). While the Qur‟an and the Sunnah are immutable, Fiqhi pronouncements 
may change due to changing circumstances.  
 
5 Gulf Cooperation Council 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Islamic laws and rules are known as Shari‟ah and the study of them is Islamic 
jurisprudence. Shari‟ah governs all aspects of Islamic matters including faith, 
worship, economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of Islamic societies. 
The rules and laws are derived from three important sources, namely the Holy 
Qur‟an, Sunna (the practice and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) and 
Ijtihad (the reasoning of qualified scholars). Further elaboration and 
interpretation of the rules dictated by the Holy Qur‟an and Sunna are provided 
by qualified scholars in Islamic jurisprudence via Ijtihad, an interpretative 
process which is carried out within the framework of the Qur‟an and Sunna. 
Modern Islamic financial products and services are developed using two 
different approaches. The first approach is by identifying existing conventional 
products and services that are generally acceptable to Islam, and modifying 
them as well as removing any prohibited elements so that they are able to 
comply with Shari‟ah principles. The second approach involves the application 
of various Shari‟ah principles to facilitate the origination and innovation of new 
products and services (Warde, 2000). 
 
Basic principles of Islamic finance 
The basis of Islamic commercial law is predicated on Fiqh al-Mua‟malat 
(literally the Fiqh of human interrelations) which advocates the principles of 
Shari‟ah with respect to civil liberties, economic freedom, social equity, justice, 
transparency and accountability in all financial matters. In Shari‟ah, the moral 
dictum that governs financial transactions and agreements is that all are 
permissible, provided that they do not include a prohibited gain, activity or 
commodity, such as Riba, Gharar, Maysir (gambling), specific foods and 
beverages and indecent activities. By integrating religious doctrine and ethical 
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conduct in financial transactions, Islamic finance offers an alternative 
framework to the Western model and sets boundaries to permissible activities 
(Hakim and Rashidian, 2004). 
 
 
 
While there may only be a handful of differences between conventional and 
Islamic financial products, the distinctions are fundamental to the structure 
and the risk/return profile of these instruments. For example, Islamic finance 
promotes risk sharing through partnerships and eschews interest-based 
charges. This fundamental difference distances Islamic banking from 
conventional finance (Wilson, 1997). For a long time, equity financing was the 
dominant financial product being offered to depositors and investors (Siddiqi, 
2000; Anwar, 2003). These are based on the concepts of profit-sharing in the 
form of Mudarabah and profit-and-loss sharing Musharakah (Ayub, 2002). 
Flanking these were Murabahah contracts that have constituted the 
cornerstone for working capital and short-term financing (AAOIFI, 2003; 
Islamic Financial Services Board, 2005a, 2005b). 
As the market evolved, Shari‟ah rules were introduced to chart the designs of 
debt financing. Here the challenge was particularly onerous because 
conventional debt is not necessarily asset-specific, whereas the Shari‟ah 
requires the existence of an underlying asset or assets to back the transaction 
(DeLorenzo, 1997; Khan, 2000; Bahrain Monetary Agency, 2002). 
 
Imam Shatibi’s Social Theory (d. 1388AD) 
The social theory contract was expounded by Imam Shatibi, who was a 
contemporary of Imam Ibn Taimiyyah. The two developed and applied the 
dynamic tenets of the Shari‟ah to practical social, economic and institutional 
issues and problems of the time. 
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Imam Shatibi was an original thinker on the development of the Shari‟ah in the 
light of individual preference and social preference and their relationship with 
the institutional tenets of public purpose. Imam Shatibi thus brought the 
Islamic discursive process (shura and rule making) to the centre of the very 
important issue of development of the Shari‟ah through discourse, Ijtihad and 
ijma (Shatibi, trans. Abdullah Darraz, 1390 Higri Calendar). Imam Shatibi‟s 
preference theory, called Al-Maslaha Wa-Istihsan, is a forerunner of the 
profound concept of social wellbeing in most recent times (SEN, 1990). In the 
perspective of this concept, Imam Shatibi took up his principles on which the 
Shari‟ah can be developed (Masud, 1994). 
These principles are (1) universal intelligibility; (2) linking the possibility of 
action to the degree of physical efforts rendered; (3) adaptation of the Shari‟ah 
to the natural and regional differentiation of customs and practices. By 
combining these attributes in the development of the Shari‟ah, Imam Shatibi 
was able to deliver a comprehensive theory of social wellbeing. The social 
wellbeing criterion explained the aggregate view of preference in society within 
the tenets of the Shari‟ah. 
By combining the above principles, Imam Shatibi examined both the core and 
the instrumental aspects of the Shari‟ah. According to his „theory of meaning‟ 
of the core of the Shari‟ah (Usul al-Shari‟ah), Imam Shatibi dismisses the 
existence of conflict, contradiction and difference in the divine law, arguing 
that at the fundamental level there is unity. Variety and disagreement, 
apparent at the second level are not the intention and objective of the law‟ 
(Masud, 1994). This aspect of Shatibi‟s perspective on the Shari‟ah adds a 
dynamic spirit to the moral law. Through such universality and the dynamic 
nature of the moral law, Imam Shatibi was aiming at a universal theory of 
social wellbeing. 
Using the integrative perspective of social preference made out of the 
interactive preferences of members of society, Imam Shatibi thought of the 
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necessities of life as fundamental life-fulfilling goods. To incorporate basic 
needs into dynamic evolution of life-sustaining regimes, he subsequently 
introduced basic-needs regimes into his analysis. 
These were the social needs for comfort and refinements of life. All the 
components, namely basic needs, comfort and refinement, were for life- 
fulfillment at the advancing levels of a basic-needs regime of socioeconomic 
development. On the basis of the dynamic basic-needs regime of socioeconomic 
development, Imam Shatibi constructed his social wellbeing criterion, and 
thereby, his theory of preference and the public purpose, Al-Maslaha Wa-
Istihsan. These ideas proved to be far in advance of their time in the social 
meaning and preferences of life. 
 
Standardization tends to be an unsavory word in the Islamic finance space. 
Although it has been pointed out time and time again that financial innovation 
is hampered by the lack of harmonized financial regulation, the different 
jurisdictions are more than happy to march to the beat of their own particular 
drummers, with a few contrarians pushing for the creation of a more global 
infrastructure.  
After all, they say, look at where Islamic finance is today, with over US$1 
trillion in assets, having quadrupled over the last three years. This too, with a 
weak systemic liquidity infrastructure, a lack of tradable Islamic Money market 
products, and a poor secondary market for Sukuk. Think of where it could be, 
if we standardized.  
Those not in favor would cite the creativity in coming up with their own 
contracts. Standardize? Why not charge interest? Why not invest in liquor? It‟s 
a slippery slope that leads to conventional finance and securitizing five times 
over to create the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.  
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While turning Islamic finance into a McDonald‟s of sorts (would you like fries 
with that?) would be far from the ideal solution, there is room for some 
standardization; in the language employed in Shari‟ah rulings, for instance. 
Standardizing the rulings would make it easier for companies to figure out 
what these fatawa mean and for the rulings to transcend borders more easily. 
Which is why the introduction of “Shari‟ah Parameters”, mentioned by 
Malaysian central bank chief Zeti Akhtar Aziz two months ago, may be more 
momentous than the initial reaction, or underwhelming response, would 
suggest. The trouble with Shari‟ah rulings, Bank Negara Malaysia observed, is 
that nobody is quite sure what they mean or how to operationalize them. 
Even the bankers are not quite familiar with Islamic finance concepts and there 
is a lack of publicly available documents on fatawa and Shari‟ah resolutions as 
sources of reference. 
It has also been pointed out that the considerable heterogeneity of scholastic 
opinion about Shari‟ah compliance makes it difficult to create a consistent 
regulatory framework and corporate governance principles. 
Bank Negara went on to say that the Shari‟ah Parameters are aimed at, among 
other things, clarifying concepts, principles and conditions of Shari‟ah 
contracts, providing the basis for decisions on matters relating to conditions, 
mechanisms and implementation of Shari‟ah contracts, to say nothing of 
facilitating Islamic finance professionals and practitioners in designing and 
developing Islamic financial products. 
It added that the Shari‟ah Parameters as standard guidance documents would 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the principles and basis of 
adopting Shari‟ah contracts for Islamic finance products thus enabling the 
harmonization of Islamic finance practices.  
What this would mean is that a Shari‟ah board could write a decision in Abu 
Dhabi or Bahrain, for instance, and it would translate beautifully in Malaysia. 
No ambiguity. No fuss. And funnily enough, a standardization in Shari‟ah 
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rulings would not stifle the development of new products; it will in fact, act as a 
stimulus. While standardization should not be the be-all and end-all in the 
development of Islamic finance, some boundaries just make for well-tended 
gardens.  
 
 
 
The Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s (SSB) Role in Corporate Governance 
 
The Shari‟ah supervisory board is part of the internal governance structure of 
an IFI and appointed by shareholders of the institution. Its main function is to 
review and ensure that all transactions, contracts, products and applications 
relating to IFIs comply with Shari‟ah rules and principles according to the 
specific fatwa, rulings and guidelines that have been issued. In order to 
establish a good corporate governance framework, the Shari‟ah supervisory 
board may have to extend its jurisdiction to cover governance issues of this 
nature.  
According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), there is no “single 
model” of corporate governance that will work in every country; each country or 
even each organization needs to develop its own model. 
From the standpoint of Islam, deeds are more significant than rhetoric, as 
highlighted in one verse of the Quran: “Why do you say that which you do not 
do?” Corporate governance should be practiced in the form of deeds. Only 
when actions speak louder than words can a good corporate culture emerge 
and protect the welfare of all. 
 
AAOIFI 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued the Governance Standard No. 1 on the Shari‟ah 
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Supervisory Board (SSB): appointment, composition and report. According to 
this standard, every Islamic financial institution will have an SSB which 
A. is an independent body of specialized jurists in Fiqh almua‟malat (Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence) 
B. Is entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the 
activities of the Islamic financial institution in order to ensure that they are in 
compliance with Islamic Shari‟ah rules and principles 
C. can issue fatawa and rulings which „shall be binding on the Islamic 
financial institution 
D. Shall consist of at least three members who are appointed by the 
shareholders  
upon the recommendation of the board of directors (not including directors or 
significant shareholders of the Islamic financial institution) 
E. shall prepare a report on the compliance of all contracts, transactions and 
dealings with the Shari‟ah rules and principles, f. shall state that the allocation 
of profit and charging of losses related to investment accounts conform to the 
basis that has been approved by the SSB; and finally 
F. shareholders may authorize the board of directors to fix the remuneration of 
the Shari‟ah Supervisory Board. 
 
The management is responsible for ensuring that the financing institution 
conducts its business in accordance with Islamic Shari‟ah rules and 
Principles‟. The responsibility of the SSB is „to form an independent opinion on 
Shari‟ah compliance. 
It should be noted that the AAOIFI standard does not contain any information 
about the duration of a SSB membership or on the possibilities and procedures 
of dismissal and reappointment. Despite the AAOIFI standard, the specific 
rules and criteria for the selection and appointment of SSB members 
(regarding, for example, the relevance and the relative weight of their Islamic 
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and secular qualifications, their scholarly reputation and general popularity, 
their doctrinal strictness or intellectual flexibility, their main occupation and 
source of income, the duration of their SSB membership and the criteria for 
reappointment and so on) as well as the quantitative and qualitative dimension 
of their financial and non-financial rewards are not well documented in sources 
open to the general public. Empirical research on the selection process of SSB 
members and their professional careers (before, during and after the 
membership) is still lacking. There are also no case studies on causes and 
consequences of multiple memberships of individual scholars in different SSBs. 
Following the guidelines of AAOIFI, the board of directors suggests the 
candidates for the SSB and determines their remuneration. Very often the 
management has a strong influence on decisions of the board of directors. 
Therefore it is plausible to assume that top executives will have a strong 
influence on the composition of the SSB and on the financial and non-financial 
rewards for SSB members. As an independent body, the SSB is not subject to 
instructions by the management, the board of directors or the shareholders. 
SSB members are free to express their opinion and to sanction or decline 
banking practices, techniques, contracts, dealings and transactions.[12] 
This, however, does not mean that they are totally untouched by economic, 
social, political and intellectual trends and developments. In addition, it has to 
be borne in mind that SSB members had an initial motivation to accept their 
appointment (whatever that motivation was, whether scholarly reputation, the 
sake of Islam, financial reward or public visibility). If the membership of a SSB 
does promote the achievement of individual goals, it is a plausible assumption 
that the SSB members are interested in a continuing membership respondent 
in a reappointment. This creates a factual dependence on the board of directors 
which nominates SSB members and on the shareholders who appoint them. In 
addition, if the interests of the management are well represented in the board 
of directors, the SSB members have to take these into consideration. As long as 
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the management is supported by the board of directors and the shareholders, 
this boils down to the hypothesis that SSB members will not ignore the 
interests of the management when they apply their interpretation of Shari‟ah 
principles to the activities, contracts and transactions of their Islamic bank. 
This does not mean that they will always find ways to accept whatever new 
financial product or transaction is submitted by the management. It must be a 
prime concern of the SSB that the Islamic character of the institution is 
recognized by the general public. But the SSB must also bear in mind the 
survival and commercial success of the institution. Given this simple set of 
behavioral assumptions for SSB members, a changing external environment 
can explain the obvious change of attitudes of SSBs towards financial 
innovations which imply new governance issues. The attitude of SSBs has  
indeed changed over the years, from being rather restrictive to becoming quite 
permissive. 
 
Changing Attitudes of Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
The early years of Islamic finance – the 1970s and 1980s – can be 
characterized as high expectations and little experience. When Islamic finance 
was introduced, not only to Muslims but also to the rest of the world, it was 
often heralded as a unique financial system based on Qur‟an and Sunna. It 
claimed superiority over the conventional Riba based system with respect to 
allocation, distribution and stability. This claim was put forward not only by 
Muslim economists but also by Islamic banking groups such as Dar 
al-Maal al-Islami. During these initial years, most shari‟a scholars were not 
very familiar 
with techniques, contracts and procedures of modern (conventional) financial 
institutions 
and markets, and they were trained neither in economics and finance nor in 
contemporary 
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business law. The economic world of traditional Islamic law was based on 
trade, 
handicrafts and agriculture, but not on industrial production, resource 
extraction, personal 
and commercial services, multiple currencies on fiat money, international 
capital 
flows, global competition, and so on. 
To underline the distinctiveness and the divine origin on the one hand, and 
owing to 
a lack of knowledge and experience on the other, SSB members often referred 
to the early 
Islamic period and recommended old legal constructs without much 
sophistication. This 
early approach was retrospective and in many ways restrictive. It created 
tensions 
between shari‟a scholars (and ideological proponents of Islamic finance) and 
the management 
of Islamic banks. Islamic bank managers had to struggle with too conservative 
SSBs which did not sanction financial instruments deemed necessary by the 
management. 
Executives designed products and techniques which were better adapted to an 
economy which had become much more diversified than that of Arabia in the 
formative 
years of Islamic commercial law.5 Trade-related contracts do not go well with 
the needs 
of the manufacturing and (non-trade) service sector. It may be owing to a lack 
of more 
appropriate financing instruments that disputable commodity transactions 
were quite 
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common in this period. In the early years of Islamic finance it was a formidable 
challenge 
to adapt the commercial law of past centuries to the needs of complex and 
diversified 
modern economies. 
After a decade Islamic banks had firmly established themselves in market 
niches. They 
heavily relied on trade-related modes of finance. Profit and loss sharing 
arrangements 
were extremely rare because of high transaction and monitoring costs, the 
danger of 
adverse selection (attracting projects with above-average probabilities of loss) 
and 
insufficient demand from the entrepreneurial customers. The discrepancy 
between the ideology 
and the practice of Islamic banking became increasingly visible. 
With the passing of time it had become apparent that traditional contracts 
could not 
be applied directly but had to be modified considerably (as with musharaka for 
continuing 
concerns instead of terminated deals) and that some of the most highly 
esteemed contracts 
(mudaraba, musharaka) implied an adverse selection and were in low demand, 
while 
new instruments had to be designed for new and more complex financing tasks 
which were 
unknown to the traditional Islamic law (for example, project or infrastructure 
financing, 
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financing of working capital, consumer finance). Furthermore, instruments for 
a more 
efficient liquidity management and the development of interest-free capital (and 
money) 
markets were in urgent need. 
During the 1980s, shari‟a scholars had accumulated more practical knowledge 
and had 
to recognize (together with Muslim economists) that the banking practice 
deviated widely 
from the ideological ideal. SSBs were confronted with requests – growing in 
number and 
urgency – of Islamic bank executives to sanction modifications of traditional 
contracts 
and financial innovations. 
Other changes in the environment of Islamic finance have occurred.While most 
Islamic 
banks held monopoly positions in their countries during the 1970s and 1980s, 
this has 
changed considerably since the mid-1990s. Today customers have a choice 
between several 
138 Handbook of Islamic banking 
Islamic financial institutions in many Islamic countries (such as Bahrain, the 
United Arab 
Emirates, Sudan, Pakistan and Malaysia). In addition, in many countries, 
conventional 
banks do offer Islamic products or have established Islamic subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, in 
countries with few restrictions on international capital movements, the range of 
Islamic 
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products is enhanced by internationally operating Islamic financial 
institutions. In sum, 
competition has increased substantially between the conventional and the 
Islamic finance 
sector as well as within the Islamic sector. Also, with the growth of the Islamic 
financial 
sector, central banks and regulatory authorities paid more attention to this 
sector. These 
institutions, which previously dealt with conventional banks, strongly 
supported the 
activities of organizations such as AAOIFI, and established in the early 2000s 
the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in Kuala Lumpur, in order to create a coherent 
legal and 
regulatory framework. 
The standardization of Islamic contracts and techniques implies that the 
importance 
of the individual SSBs of Islamic banks is considerably reduced, at least for 
established 
(standard) transactions. When standard techniques are part of everyday life, 
financial 
innovations become the major instrument for Islamic banks in their 
competition amongst 
each other and with Islamic products or subsidiaries of conventional banks. 
Standardization of traditional techniques and financial innovations as the main 
vehicle 
of competition does have far-reaching implications for the role and relevance of 
SSBs: 
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a. Standardization curtails the importance of individual SSBs for the „daily 
business‟ of 
Islamic banks. 
b. Financial innovations are basically designed and engineered by the 
management and 
put forward to the SSB for a shari‟a assessment. 
c. In a highly competitive environment, the prosperity of a bank will depend 
crucially 
on its innovative potential. 
d. If an SSB wants to maintain its importance, its members must adopt an 
attitude 
towards financial engineering and product innovations which is less 
retrospective and 
restrictive but more prospective and permissive. 
Innovations create new business opportunities, as long as the innovator has a 
competitive 
edge. When imitation sets in, temporary „monopoly profits‟ (or „innovation 
rents‟) will 
dwindle away. Therefore neither the management nor the SSB has an interest 
in too much 
disclosure of the Islamic qualities of financial innovations as this could speed 
up imitation 
by other banks. Islamic banking is by its character more complicated (because 
it has 
to meet the requirements of the secular and the Islamic legal system) and less 
transparent 
than conventional banking. The need to keep „Islamic business secrets‟ makes 
it even 
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more opaque than riba-based banking. Credibility of the Islamic qualities of the 
products 
and transactions is achieved, not by disclosure, but by the reputation and 
public 
recognition of the members of the SSB. 
The technical details of new transactions and innovative products can be quite 
complicated. 
A well-founded shari‟a analysis and assessment requires much financial 
expertise 
by the shari‟a experts. Distinguished and well-known shari‟a scholars with a 
profound 
understanding of financial techniques are in short supply. This explains why 
the names of 
some outstanding shari‟a scholars are found in the SSBs of several Islamic 
financial institutions, 
and in addition in advisory boards or committees of regulatory authorities and 
Governance of Islamic banks 139 
standard-setting organizations (such as AAOIFI or IFSB). This raises several 
governance 
issues at the macro or policy level. For example, if prominent members of SSBs 
determine 
the Islamic framework of Islamic banks, set the tone of public opinion and give 
advice to 
regulatory agencies, how will the independence of regulators be assured? 
It seems that SSBs no longer impede the progress of financial technology. 
Instead, a 
legalistic view has become dominant which deconstructs complex financial 
techniques, 
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products and contracts into a number of more basic components which 
resemble (or are 
identical with) legal figures of the traditional Islamic commercial law. The 
shari‟a quality 
of these components is then assessed for each component separately. If no 
objections are 
raised against a component, the total product is sanctioned. This method 
seemingly supports 
financial engineering and product innovation in the Islamic segment of the 
financial 
market, but it has one very serious weakness: elements which are perfectly 
legitimate 
separately may interact in such a way that the result comes into contradiction 
of fundamental 
principles of Islamic law. The dispute over the legitimacy of banking practices 
in 
Pakistan is a well documented historical case, and questionable public debt 
issues in the 
form of sukuks are more recent examples. 
Besides the structural (external) factors for the change from a rather restrictive 
to a very 
permissive attitude of SSBs, some personal (internal) factors may also be of 
relevance. 
First, if membership of an SSB is desirable for a shari‟a expert, he will avoid as 
far as possible 
whatever may endanger his reappointment. The attraction of SSB membership 
can 
have various reasons, ranging from idealistic objectives (participating in the 
shaping of 
Shari’ah Board, The Task of Fatwa, and Ijtihad in 
Islamic Economics, and Finance 
2009 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
the Islamic finance system) to material considerations (substantial financial 
compensation 
for SSB members). 
Second, it seems that a sufficiently large number of clients of Islamic banks 
and public 
opinion leaders do not require a very strict adherence to instruments and 
techniques of 
the traditional Islamic business law. They are satisfied with the observance of 
legal 
minimum requirements. The ideological impetus of the early years has become 
a minority 
position. If this is a correct picture of the public and political environment in 
many 
Muslim countries, then a too restrictive stance of SSB members could provoke 
much 
public criticism which would endanger the reputation of SSB members and put 
them in 
a defensive position. This is a serious problem particularly if other (more) 
eminent shari‟a 
scholars outside the given SSB approve similar techniques or products. 
External and internal factors can explain why SSBs have adopted a more 
permissive 
attitude towards financial innovations. This seems to be the best way to 
maintain the 
importance of the SSB and its individual members. If the bulk of Islamic 
financial techniques 
and products become standardized, an SSB is relevant only with respect to 
nonstandard 
products and procedures, and these are usually financial innovations. A 
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restrictive stance against innovations which are proposed by the Islamic bank‟s 
management 
could cause a conflict with the management, the board of directors and also 
with 
shareholders who want a „progressive‟ or innovative bank or see a threat to the 
profitability 
of the bank.Without innovative products, the bank may suffer a competitive 
setback, 
and the relevant question becomes what the SSB is good for. It is welcome only 
if it does 
not block, but facilitates, innovations. 
The SSB is a unique element in the governance structure of Islamic banks 
(compared 
to conventional banks) which follows its own logic. Its members are no 
advocates for the 
interests of Islamic depositors: 
140 Handbook of Islamic banking 
a. SSBs have sanctioned smoothing techniques which give much discretionary 
power to 
the management and imply various distribution conflicts (between 
shareholders and 
Islamic depositors as well as among different „generations‟ of depositors). 
b. The members of the SSBs, though formally independent, do have many 
strong incentives 
to foster good relations with the management of the Islamic bank, at least if 
they 
are interested in continuing membership of the SSB. One implication is that 
SSBs 
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nowadays have become definitely permissive with regard to financial 
innovations. 
c. The SSB issues statements and reports on the Islamic qualities of the 
transactions and 
products of its Islamic bank. But when it comes to the specifics of the financial 
innovations, 
the informational content of these publications is very limited. 
d. It is not despite, but because of, the activities of SSBs that the economic 
(and ideological) 
distinctiveness of Islamic banking becomes blurred. 
Although the SSBs are unique elements in the governance structure, they do 
not contribute 
to the solution of old governance problems. Instead, they add new governance 
issues at the macro and political level. 
 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
CONCLUCIONS, RECCOMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
 
When we have fundamental differences in fatawa issued around the world, we 
are not really building a well-structured system. We invite much market 
distortion manifesting itself in cross border arbitrage, market arbitrage, legal 
arbitrage and, most dangerously, Shari‟ah arbitrage, which could at some point 
lead to faith arbitrage. We have to always remember that this system is driven 
by faith. It‟s not driven by transactions. It‟s driven by how we believe 
transactions should be made and executed. 
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So when we have a system that is not consistent and has varied interpretations 
and pronouncements, we run the risk of imbalances and instability. This is not 
a system that we would like to build. So we have to endeavor to reach 
consensus and this is exactly what regulatory bodies like AAOIFI does. Their 
Shari‟ahh board consists of all major sects in Islam. What we try to do is come 
up with a structure that is acceptable to all those schools of thoughts. 
 
It was also noted in AAOIFI standard that Shari‟ah Supervisory Boards should 
not limit their role to the issuance of fatawa on the permissibility of (i.e. the 
Sukuk structure, or any other Islamic financial product or instrument but 
should continue to oversee the actual means of implementation at every stage 
of the product‟s life. 
We need to do screening of all the products available in the market and 
evaluate the adherence of those products and the compatibility to Shari‟ah 
principles and rules. We will identify those products that are in violation and 
we will voice it out to the public. We will also try to talk to the concerned 
parties about those products and perhaps provide some form of advice and 
share with them ways to modify those products so that they are completely 
Shari‟ah compliant. 
It is not AAOIFI‟s role to be the watchdog of the industry. They are, after all, a 
standard issuing body. However, I believe there is a huge gap in the market 
regarding what is Shari‟ah compliant and what is not. And we thought we can 
take advantage of our superior Shari‟ah board members to watch the market 
and identify what is Shari‟ah compliant and what is not. We believe that 
AAOIFI could take on that role temporarily; they‟re not going to be the 
watchdog for the industry forever. 
We live in a unique time of the Islamic Finance Industry. Although it is a huge 
initiative that will no doubt be full of challenges, we think it is desperately 
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needed in the market, especially nowadays where we have a golden opportunity 
to present a wonderful well-structured system 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
This section explains some Arabic words and terms occurring in this project 
paper. 
Arbun is a non-refundable deposit to secure the right to cancel or proceed with 
a sale during a certain period of time. 
Bai al-Dayn means the sale of debt or a liability at a discount or negotiated 
price. 
Bai al-Inah is a contract that involves the sale and buy back of assets by a 
seller. 
Bai bi-thaman Ajil is deferred payment sale by installments. 
Bai’muajjal is deferred payment sale. 
Bai Salam is pre-paid purchase. 
Bay (Bai) is a comprehensive term that applies to sale transactions, exchange. 
Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence, the science of religious law, which is the 
interpretation of the Sacred Law, Shari‟ah. 
Gharar is uncertainty, speculation. 
Hadith (plural a hadith) is the technical term for the source related to the 
Sunna, the sayings and doings – of the Prophet, his traditions. 
Halal means permitted according to Shari‟ah. 
Haram means forbidden according to Shari‟ah. 
Hiyal (plural of hila) are „permissions‟ or legal manipulations, evasions. 
Ijarah contract is a leasing contract. 
Ijarah wal iqtina’a is a lease-purchase contract, whereby the client has the 
option of purchasing the item. 
Ijma means consensus among jurists based on the Holy Qur‟an and sunna, 
and one of the four sources of law in Sunni Islam. 
Ijtihad means the act of independent reasoning by a qualified jurist in order to 
reach new legal rules. 
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Islam is submission or surrender to the will of God. 
Istijrar refers to a sale in which an asset is supplied on a continuing basis at 
an agreed price payable at a future date. 
Istisnaa is a contract to manufacture. 
Ju’alah is the stipulated price (commission) for performing any service. 
Kafalah is a contract of guarantee or taking of responsibility for a liability 
provided by a guarantor, kafeel. 
Maysir means gambling, from a pre-Islamic game of hazard. 
Mudarabah contract is a trustee financing contract, where one party, the 
financier, entrusts funds to the other party, the entrepreneur, for undertaking 
an activity. 
Mudarib means an entrepreneur or a manager of a Mudarabah project. 
Murabahah is resale with a stated profit; for example the bank purchases a 
certain asset and sells it to the client on the basis of a cost plus mark-up profit 
principle. 
Musharakah contract is an equity participation contract, whereby two or more 
partners contribute with funds to carry out an investment. 
Muslim is one who professes the faith of Islam or is born to a Muslim family. 
Nisab is the minimum acceptable standard of living. 
Qard hasan is a benevolent loan (interest-free). 
Qiyas means analogical deduction. 
Qur’an is the Holy Book, the revealed word of God, followed by all Muslims. 
Rabb al-mal refers to the owner of capital or financier in a Mudarabah 
partnership agreement (also sahib al-mal). 
Riba is literally „excess‟ or „increase‟, and covers both interest and usury. 
Shari’ah is Islamic religious law derived from the Holy Qur‟an and the sunna. 
Shirkah (or sharika) is a society or partnership. 
Sukuk is a freely tradable Islamic participation certificate based on the 
ownership and exchange of an approved asset. 
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Sunna is a source of information concerning the practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his Companions, and is the second most authoritative source 
of Islamic law. 
Suwar (pl. Surat) is a chapter of the Holy Qur‟an. There are 114 Surat of 
varying length and in all references to the Holy Qur‟an (for example 30:39) the 
first number refers to the sura and the second to the ayah or verse. 
Tabarru means charity or donation. In takaful, it is a voluntary pooled fund 
for the benefit of all members. 
Takaful refers to mutual support which is the basis of the concept of 
insurance or solidarity among Muslims. 
Ulama are the learned class, especially those learned in religious matters. 
Ummah means the community; the body of Muslims. 
Wadiah means safe custody or deposit. 
Wakalah involves a contract of agency on a fee-for-services basis with an 
agent, wakil. 
Waqf is a trust or pious foundation. 
Zakat is a religious levy or almsgiving as required in the Holy Qur‟an and is 
one of the five pillars of Islam. 
